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ABSTRACT
Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mechanism for litigating pharmaceutical patent
infringement disputes. Many of these cases have been settled with “reverse payments” from the
brand to the generic in return for delayed generic entry. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has contested a number of these settlements with mixed results. On July 16, 2012, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision holding that pharmaceutical patent settlements that
restrict generic entry and contain a payment to the generic company are presumptively unlawful
under U.S. antitrust laws. By holding that a patent settlement can violate antitrust laws without
proof that it affected competition outside the scope of a valid patent, the decision directly conflicts
with the holdings of three other U.S. Courts of Appeals, and sets up a strong debate across the
nation. On December 7, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court finally agreed to review an antitrust
challenge to reverse payment settlements and granted a writ of certiorari. This comment analyzes
the conflict among the U.S. Courts of Appeals involving differential applications of either patent law
or antitrust law to address reverse payment settlements. After analyzing the conflict, this comment
offers a set of rules to guide the U.S. Supreme Court and legislators in determining the legality of
such reverse payment settlements.
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REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS
FINALLY AGREED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.
TYLER CHO*
INTRODUCTION
Our legal system encourages parties to settle out of court.1 Settlements of
patent disputes often take the form of unrestricted or restricted licenses, crosslicensing arrangements, market division agreements, or field-of-use agreements.2
These settlements are encouraged in part because they produce more competition in
the market than a judgment establishing the validity of a rival’s claim and excluding
a competitor from the market.3 However, some settlements require a party’s delayed
entry into the market. Such settlements may be problematic because they seem to
violate antitrust law, even if they may still be valid under the exclusionary right of a
patent.4
Over the past decade, this type of settlement has emerged in litigation over
pharmaceutical patents.5 The settlements are known as “reverse payment” or “payfor-delay” settlements.6 Unlike traditional pharmaceutical patent infringement
settlements, all reverse payment settlements share a unique feature: the payment
goes from the patent holder to the alleged infringer.7
Reverse payment settlements occur in the unique setting of the Drug
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch* © Tyler Cho 2013. J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL;
B.S. in Biochemistry (2003), Queen’s University, Canada; Ph.D. in Biochemistry (2009), Queen’s
University, Canada; Post-Doctoral Fellow (2011), University of Toronto, Canada. I would like to
thank Professor Benjamin Liu for insightful discussions surrounding pharmaceutical patents. I
would like to thank the RIPL editorial board for support and guidance in bringing this comment to
publication. Most of all, I would like to thank my lovely wife, Kate Y. Jung, for her great support,
patience, guidance, and encouragement throughout my life.
1 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1721 (2003).
2 Id. at 1721.
3 Id. at 1722.
4 Id. at 1723–24.
5 See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
281, 293 (2011) (stating that as with any litigation, settlement of patent suits is not unusual;
however, reverse payments are unusual that the patentee pays the challenger while simultaneously
preserving its patent monopoly); David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse
Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1304 (2010) (describing
reverse payment settlements as a unique system for the branded manufacturer to buy off the
generic company’s challenge).
6 See, e.g., Opderbeck, supra note 5, at 1304 (referring to the agreements both as “reverse
payment settlements” and “reverse settlements”); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to
Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
632 (2009) (referring to the agreements as “pay-for-delay” settlements).
7 Dolin, supra note 5, at 293–94 (“[U]nlike usual patent litigation . . . Hatch-Waxman litigation
occurs prior to the generic drug actually entering the market. . . . [T]he patentee often pays amounts
far exceeding the cost of litigation to the challengers.”).
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Waxman Act.8 The Act provides incentives for a generic manufacturer to challenge a
branded pharmaceutical manufacturer’s existing patents by creating a 180-day
marketing exclusivity period for the first challenger of an issued patent.9 This
provision was designed to help eradicate weak patents and facilitate competition
with generics.10 Instead, the Act has enabled branded pharmaceutical companies to
buy off the generic companies’ challenges.11
These reverse payment settlements have created significant antitrust
concerns.12 For years, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”), and numerous private plaintiffs have challenged these settlements. 13
The FTC has been largely unsuccessful in the courts, and its efforts have resulted in
a conflict within the United States Courts of Appeals over whether reverse payment
settlements warrant antitrust scrutiny.14 Denials of petitions for certiorari by the
U.S. Supreme Court have helped maintain this tension between the exclusivity
arising under patent law and the prohibitions against restraint of free competition
under antitrust law.15
Recently, the Third Circuit held that reverse payment settlements are
presumptively unlawful under U.S. antitrust laws.16 By holding that a reverse
payment settlement can violate antitrust laws without proof of its effect on
competition outside the scope of a valid patent, the decision directly conflicts with the
holdings of three other U.S. Courts of Appeals. 17 Due to the inconsistencies in
holdings, the U.S. Supreme Court finally agreed to review an antitrust challenge to
reverse payment settlements and granted certiorari on December 7, 2012. 18 Part I of
this comment describes the regulatory context and the nature of reverse payment
settlements. Part II discusses the direct conflict between the decisions of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, and the effects of FTC challenges on reverse payment settlements.
Part III then proposes a solution to the problem of reverse payment settlements.

8 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman), Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
9 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
10 Id.
11 Dolin, supra note 5, at 283 (defining reverse settlement agreements).
12 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 2005).
13 Opderbeck, supra note 5, at 1305.
14 Id. at 1308. For example, the Sixth Circuit has focused on antitrust law to hold that reverse
payment settlements are per se illegal, while the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have
focused on patent law’s exclusionary right, resulting in minimal exposure to antitrust liability.
Compare La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) (“per se illegal”), with Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 214–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (“minimal exposure to
antitrust liability”).
15 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 214–15, rehearing en banc denied,
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. v. Bayer Ag, No. 2008-1097, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
27711 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG & Bayer
Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
16 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012).
17 Id. at 218.
18 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), petition for cert. granted,
81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History of The Hatch-Waxman Act
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer was required to
conduct its own tests and studies to prove a drug’s safety and efficacy, even if the
drug contained exactly the same components as the brand-name counterpart.19 At
the time, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) conducted its clinical review
and approval process of generics in the same way it did for any other new drug.20
Because of this lengthy and expensive approval process without the reward of a
patented product, generic manufacturers were reluctant to proceed with the
development of generic drugs.21
Further, the Patent Act prohibited generic
manufacturers from using a patented drug as a template for developing their own
generic equivalents, thereby forcing generic manufacturers to wait until the patent
expired.22 This effectively extended the branded manufacturers’ exclusive period for
years by creating a de facto term extension that further sustained high drug costs. 23
As a result, 150 branded drugs with expired patent protection lacked generic
equivalents when the Hatch-Waxman Act passed in 1984.24
The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to adjust patent policy by amending both the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Patent Act.25 As to the former, the HatchWaxman Act introduced a new process called the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”).26 Under ANDA, the generic manufacturer can rely on the safety and
efficacy data used in the FDA approval process for the branded drugs by showing
that the generic and branded drugs are bioequivalents. 27 This process was designed

19 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse
Payments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 18 (2007) (stating that prior to
the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, “the generic manufacturer was required to undertake full
clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy”).
20 Opderbeck, supra note 5, at 1306.
21 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY, at viii (2002) [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY], available at http://www.ftc
.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
22 See id. at 4; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
23 See Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of Biotechnology, Patent
Law, and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 540 (2010) (“[F]orcing generic drug makers
to wait until after patent expiration to commence the lengthy FDA approval process, in effect,
created a de facto term extension that further inhibited the public’s access to affordable medicine.").
24 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 18.
25 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585 (1984) (“An Act To amend the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug applications, to amend title 35,
United States Code, to authorize the extension of the patents for certain regulated products, and for
other purposes.”).
26 Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1585–92.
27 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2012). As the Caraco court explained:

Those amendments allow a generic competitor to file an abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA) piggy-backing on the brand's NDA. Rather than providing
independent evidence of safety and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the
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to eliminate the need for duplicative tests and to speed up the introduction of lowcost generic drugs to market. 28 The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act so
that it is no longer “infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell . . . a patented
invention” if the uses are “reasonably related to the development and
submission . . . under a Federal Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs.”29 This has allowed generic manufacturers to develop bioequivalents during
the patent life of branded drugs, and further, it has allowed them to market these
low-cost drugs as soon as the branded drug’s patent protection expires.30
B. The Framework of the Hatch-Waxman Litigation
For a new drug, an applicant must submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”),
which requires multiple clinical trials for safety and efficacy.31 The holder of an
approved NDA must provide to the FDA the patent number and expiration date of
every patent covering the brand-name drug for the FDA’s approval.32 Upon approval,
the FDA lists each patent submitted on a website called “Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” commonly known as the “Orange
Book.”33 To secure FDA approval in light of these listings, an ANDA applicant must
certify to the FDA that its version of the approved drug will not interfere with any of
the “listed” patents.34 That is, a generic manufacturer seeking ANDA application
must certify to one of the following: “(I) that such patent information has not been
filed; (II) that such patent has expired; (III) the date such patent will expire; or (IV)
that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the new drug for which the application is submitted.”35
With a Paragraph I, II, or III certification, no issues of patent law arise because
the patents at issue are either expired or will expire on a certain date.36 A Paragraph
IV certification, on the other hand, triggers a series of events that usually lead to
litigation of the underlying patent. 37
An ANDA filer with a Paragraph IV certification must explain why such a
patent is invalid and notify the patent holder of its ANDA application.38 Then, the
generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to,
the brand-name drug.
Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
28 Id.
29 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
30 Id.
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
32 See id. § 355(b)(1).
33 See Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 631, 638 (2007); Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm
(last updated Nov. 16, 2012).
34 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
35 Id.
36 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(III).
37 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
38 Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
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patent holder has the option to bring an infringement action against the ANDA filer
or to waive his right to the patent.39 If the patent holder elects to file the lawsuit
within forty-five days after receiving such notice, the effective date of any FDA
approval of the ANDA application is delayed for thirty months or until the resolution
of the lawsuit, whichever comes first. 40 This thirty-month stay period provides ample
time for the ANDA approval process and any subsequent litigation. 41 However, only
a single thirty-month stay is available.42
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives for potential competitors to
challenge drug patents before they expire.43 More specifically, the first ANDA filer is
awarded a 180-day period of market exclusivity beginning either (1) from the date it
begins commercial marketing of the generic drug product or (2) from a court decision
ruling that the patent is invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier. 44 The purpose
of the 180-day exclusivity provision is to insure that the first ANDA filer has a fair
opportunity to recover its litigation costs. 45 However, if the litigation is resolved in
the ANDA filer’s favor, the ANDA filer must market its generic drug within seventyfive days or forfeit its 180-day exclusivity period.46 Even if the Paragraph IV
challenge fails, the challenger still receives the 180-day exclusivity period for being
the first filer; it only needs to wait until the patent expires.47
C. Overview of Reverse Payment Settlements
A typical reverse payment settlement between the first ANDA filer and the
patent right holder arises from two provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act: (1) the
retention of the 180-day market exclusivity provision, and (2) the “Failure to Market”
provision.48

39 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (“[A]pproval shall be made effective immediately
unless, before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice . . . is received, an action is
brought for infringement of the patent . . . .”).
40 Id. (“[T]he approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period
beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice.”).
41 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived
Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 422 (1999).
42 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C). Before the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman framework,
an NDA holder could amend its Orange Book entries to list new patents. See FTC GENERIC DRUG
ENTRY STUDY, supra note 21, at 43. Thus, such an amendment would require new Paragraph IV
certifications, which would in turn trigger a new thirty-month stay. Id.
43 See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 634–35 (2009); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
44 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
45 Engelberg, supra note 41, at 423.
46 Hemphill, supra note 43, at 634.
47 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the
successful-defense is not a prerequisite to the invocation of the 180-day exclusivity rule by a first
applicant under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)).
48 See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012) (“180-day exclusivity period”); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (“failure to market”).
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The first ANDA filer solely holds the 180-day market exclusivity, and it cannot
be transferred to any later filers even if the first filer forfeits this right. 49 Thus, there
is no incentive for later filers to carry the burden of litigation costs. 50 Further, the
interpretation of the forfeiture provision may lead to a situation where the 180-day
exclusivity will almost never be forfeited.51
For example, suppose the first ANDA filer obtains its 180-day exclusivity period,
and as the 30-month stay period expires, it obtains the right to market its generic
drugs. A failure to market its generic drugs after the FDA’s approval will lead to the
forfeiture of its 180-day exclusivity period, unless one of the following occurs: (1) a
court enters a final decision from which no appeal can be taken that the patent is
invalid or not infringed; (2) a court signs a settlement order or consent decree
entering a finding of an invalid patent or non-infringement; or (3) the patent holder
delists the patent from the Orange Book.52 Accordingly, a settlement will allow the
first ANDA filer to maintain its 180-day exclusivity period and avoid forfeiture
because there will be no court ruling.53 This structural “loophole” provides the basis
for a reverse payment settlement to occur between the first ANDA filer and the
patent holder because the settlement benefits both parties. 54 The first ANDA filer
will retain the exclusivity period and will receive payments, including the costs of
patent litigation, while the branded company enjoys its monopoly over the patented
product.55
D. Antitrust Law vs. Patent Law
In general, an agreement between competitors to allocate market share is
deemed anticompetitive because it has a tendency to diminish output and raise
prices.56 Accordingly, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract,
49 See Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1076 (stating that a 180-day exclusivity period is
available only to the first ANDA filer to challenge a patent holder for the validity of its patent,
regardless of the success on the merits).
50 Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research, to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 4, at 5 (Jan. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/DOCKETS/07n0389/07n-0389-let0003.pdf.
51 Id. at 4–5.
52 Id.

We find that under the plain language of the statute, 180-day exclusivity is not
forfeited for failure to market when an event under subpart (aa) has occurred,
but—as in this case—none of the events in subpart (bb) has occurred. The "failure
to market" provision results in forfeiture when there are two dates on the basis of
which FDA may identify the "later" event as described in section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
The provision does not effect a forfeiture when an event under subpart (aa) has
occurred, but no event under subpart (bb) has yet occurred.
Id. at 5.
53 Id. at 5 n.6.
54 Hemphill, supra note 43, at 635.
55 Dolin, supra note 5, at 293 (stating that generic companies can avoid the costs of patent
litigation, $5 million on average, by settling the lawsuit).
56 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”57 Although by its
terms the Act prohibits any “restraint of trade,” the Supreme Court “has long
recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”58 Some
types of agreements are so obviously anticompetitive that they are “per se”
violations.59 In most cases, however, courts presumptively apply a “rule of reason”
analysis to determine whether an agreement imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors including specific information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed,
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.60 If one party makes certain payments
to potential competitors in return for their delayed market entry, the agreement will
likely violate antitrust law.61
However, problems arise when the agreements involve patents because patents
grant their owner the lawful right to exclude others. 62 This exclusionary right
provides a patentee control over its patent.63 For example, a patentee could choose to
exclude everyone from producing the patented article, could choose to be the sole
supplier itself,64 or could grant exclusive territorial licenses among its licensees. 65
For these reasons, courts and scholars have suggested that the traditional “rule of
reason” analysis is not a good fit for practices that would be unlawful per se, but for
the presence of a patent claim.66 Others, including the FTC and other scholars, 67
57 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 2 further states that “every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nation, shall be guilty of a
felony.” Id. § 2.
58 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
59 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that a finding of per
se unlawfulness “is appropriate once experience with a particular type of restraint enables the Court
to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it”); see also United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (observing that an agreement between competitors to allocate
territories is a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
60 Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5. Under the law of the Second Circuit, the rule of reason analysis is a
three-step process:

First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action
has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.
Then, if the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the
pro-competitive redeeming virtues of the action. Should the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be
achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition.
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).
61 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
62 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215
(1980) (“[T]he essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented
invention.”).
63 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
64 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (providing that a patent is assignable in law).
66 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1725.
67 Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent
Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 60 (2010) (explaining that reverse payment settlements have been
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have vigorously argued for scrutiny of these settlements under antitrust law.
Although such settlements may induce earlier patent expiration, they also “reduce
expected static consumer welfare.”68
II. ANALYSIS
While each settlement has different terms, the general parameters are quite
similar across all settlements. This section discusses the conflict among the Federal
Courts of Appeals in reaction to such settlements, and analyzes how the FTC
antitrust challenges to those settlements were unsuccessful.
A. The Sixth Circuit (2003): Per Se Illegal
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the issues
involving one of the first reverse payment settlements that attracted significant
public scrutiny.69 Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMR”) was the licensee of the
formulation patent that describes the “dissolution profile” of Cardizem CD, a
prescription drug used for treating angina and hypertension and preventing heart
attacks.70 The dissolution profile claimed by this formulation patent was for zero to
forty-five percent of the total Cardizem CD to be released within eighteen hours
(“45%-18”).71
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”) filed an ANDA application with a
Paragraph IV certification as a first filer, stating that its generic product did not
infringe any of HMR’s patents listed in the FDA.72 Specifically, the dissolution
profile for Andrx’s generic product was not less than fifty-five percent of total
Cardizem CD released within eighteen hours (“55%-18”).73 Despite the differences in
the dissolution profile for each product, HMR nonetheless continued its patent
infringement litigation against Andrx. 74
During the thirty-month stay period, HMR and Andrx entered into a settlement
agreement.75 In exchange for Andrx’s delayed market entry, HMR agreed to pay
Andrx $40 million per year, paid quarterly, beginning from the date when the
statutory thirty-month stay expired to the date when such a final unappealable
challenged by private litigants, the FTC, and the DOJ, and that reverse payment settlements are
agreement that unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
68 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The
FTC alleged that Schering’s settlement . . . were illegal agreements in restraint of trade, . . . in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, . . . [and] also charged that Schering monopolized and
conspired to monopolize the potassium supplement market.”); Hemphill, supra note 43, at 652–53
(finding that the 18 of 25 generic manufacturers retained their full 180-day exclusivity period by
agreeing to pre-expiration entry date of more than 180 days).
69 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 869, 901–02 (6th Cir. 2003).
70 Id. at 901.
71 Id. at 902.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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ruling was rendered in Andrx’s favor.76 The agreement further provided that Andrx
would receive a final payment of $100 million, less any interim payments, if the
litigation were terminated without a finding of infringement. 77 About a year after
the thirty-month stay expired, the litigation was finally settled without a finding of
infringement, and Andrx received $89.83 million in total while retaining the benefit
of the 180-day market exclusivity.78
The direct and indirect purchasers and other putative class representatives
challenged the legality of the agreements under antitrust law. 79 According to the
Sixth Circuit, the agreement guaranteed HMR exclusive access to the market even
after Andrx obtained the FDA’s final approval of its generic drugs.80 As such, the
court upheld the district court’s ruling that “the Agreement . . . was, at its core, a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD
throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of
trade.”81
B. The Eleventh Circuit (2003): Not Per Se Illegal
At about the same time the Sixth Circuit reviewed the agreements between
HMR and Andrx, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed settlements between Abbott
Laboratories (“Abbott”) and a generic manufacturer, Geneva Pharmaceuticals
(“Geneva”), concerning the hypertension and prostate drug Hytrin. 82 Geneva filed a
Paragraph IV certification as a first ANDA filer with respect to Abbott’s patents and
Abbott subsequently sued Geneva for infringement.83 The parties eventually
settled.84

76

Id.
Andrx would not market a bioequivalent or generic version of Cardizem CD in the
United States until the earliest of: (1) Andrx obtaining a favorable, final and
unappealable determination in the patent infringement case; (2) HMR and Andrx
entering into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entering into a license agreement
with a third party. Andrx also agreed to dismiss its antitrust and unfair
competition counterclaims, to diligently prosecute its ANDA, and to not
"relinquish or otherwise compromise any right accruing thereunder or pertaining
thereto," including its 180-day period of exclusivity.

Id.
Id. at 903.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 907.
81 Id. at 908 (emphasis in original). The petition for certiorari was subsequently denied by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 125 S. Ct. 307 (2004), petition for cert.
denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3236 (Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-779).
82 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2003).
83 Id. at 1298–99. Another party, Zenith Goldline Parmaceuticals (“Zenith”), was involved in
the lawsuit. Id. at 1299. Eventually, Zenith agreed not to sell or distribute its generic version of
Hytrin “until someone else introduced a generic [Hytrin] product first or until Abbott’s
patent . . . expired.” Id. at 1300.
84 Id. at 1300.
77
78
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In the settlement, Geneva agreed not to sell or distribute any product
containing Abbott’s patented forms of Hytrin until the patents expired, another party
introduced a generic drug, or a final unappealable judgment issued that the patents
were invalid.85 In return, Abbott would pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until
the agreement terminated by its own terms. 86
A group of plaintiffs filed an antitrust action against these agreements. 87 While
recognizing that an agreement between competitors to allocate markets is clearly
anticompetitive, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s (as well as the Sixth
Circuit’s) characterization of the agreements as illegal per se because one of the
parties owned a patent.88 The court rested its decision on patent law’s grant to the
patent owner the right to exclude others.89 Thus, the exclusionary effects of the
agreements “cannot trigger the per se label because these are at the heart of the
patent right.”90
In so holding, the court emphasized that “the mere subsequent declaration of
invalidity [did] not render the patent irrelevant to the appropriate antitrust analysis”
as long as a settlement was made “reasonably within the scope of the patent.”91 Even
a large reverse payment would not necessarily suggest a weak patent because,
“[g]iven the asymmetries of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee confident
in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer a substantial sum in
settlement.”92 The court remanded the case for the lower court to consider these
issues.93
C. The Second Circuit (2006): Presumptively Lawful
In 2006, the Second Circuit faced the reverse payment settlement that involved
a blockbuster cancer drug, tamoxifen.94 Zeneca, Inc. sued in response to Barr’s
Paragraph IV certification, but lost in the district court, which declared the patent
invalid.95

85 Id. A final unappealable judgment included not only the judgment from the district court,
but also the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id.
86 Id.
Ultimately, Abbott lost the suit against Geneva when Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment of invalidity, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied Abbott’s petition
for certiorari. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., Nos. 96 C 3331, 96 C 5868, 97 C 7587, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13864, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1998) (declaring the ‘207 patent invalid); Abbott
Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (upholding the invalidity).
87 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
88 Id. at 1304.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1306.
91 Id. (recognizing, however, that prohibiting the marketing of non-infringing products would
expose the patent holder to antitrust liability).
92 Id. at 1310.
93 Id. at 1312.
94 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006).
95 Id. at 193.
The district court held that tamoxifen patent was invalid because ICI had
deliberately withheld “crucial information” from the USPTO regarding the clinical test results.
Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc. (Tamoxifen I), 795 F. Supp. 619, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). ICI subsequently appealed the district court’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals
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While the appeal was pending, Zeneca and Barr entered into a settlement
agreement.96 Similar to other reverse payment settlements, Barr agreed to not
market its own generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca’s patent expired in 2002.
An unappealable judgment was rendered in favor of Barr, with Barr retaining the
180-day exclusivity period.97 In return, Barr was not only paid $21 million, but also
received a non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca-manufactured tamoxifen.98
The parties further filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss the Appeals as Moot and to
Vacate the Judgment Below,” which was granted by the Federal Circuit.99
Consequently, Zeneca’s patent remained valid.100 Thereafter, three other generic
manufacturers filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications to challenge the
validity, but the courts upheld the validity of Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent.101
Unlike the plaintiffs in Valley Drug and In re Cardizem, the plaintiffs here did
not argue that the agreements were per se illegal.102 Rather, they argued that the
tamoxifen patent was unenforceable at the time of the settlement because the district
court declared it invalid, and the payment offered by Zeneca to Barr was “excessive,”
and therefore, anti-competitive.103
The Second Circuit disagreed.104 First, the agreement made after the district
court’s ruling against Zeneca was legitimate because the risk of losing on appeal may
induce both parties to settle before the appeal is decided. 105 Next, the court held the
agreement was not excessive because under the circumstances of a Paragraph IV
certification, “the ANDA filer might well have the whip hand.”106
Further, the court rejected the notion that reverse payment settlements are per
se violations of the Sherman Act, and agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that those
settlements do not violate antitrust law “unless the ‘the exclusionary effects of the
agreement’ exceed the ‘scope of the patent’s protection.’”107 The court ruled that the
agreement between Zeneca and Barr did not exceed the scope of the patent because
the agreement: (1) did not restrain Barr’s marketing of non-infringing products

for the Federal Circuit. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tomoxifen II), 277 F. Supp. 2d 121,
125 (E.D.N.Y 2003).
96 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 193.
97 Id. at 193.
98 Id. at 193. Under this agreement, Barr was licensed to sell Zeneca-manufactured tamoxifen
under its own label, rather than Zeneca’s trademark Nolvadex®. Id.
99 Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma GmbH & Co., No. 92-1403, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14872, at *1–3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 1993). Such a vacatur was shortly thereafter held to be
invalid in nearly all circumstances by the Supreme Court. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner
Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27–29 (1994). However, the U.S. Bancrop rule does not apply retroactively,
meaning that it did not apply in this case. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 194.
100 Imperial Chem. Indus.,1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14872, at *3.
101 Zeneca Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 96-1364, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6634, at *4–11 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 10, 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., No. 96-12413, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22631,
at *51–53 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2000); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 196.
102 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).
103 Id. at 202–08.
104 Id. at 202–20.
105 Id. at 205. Further, the subsequent validation of the tamoxifen patent supported the court’s
ruling. Id. at 204.
106 Id. at 210.
107 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006).
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because it was a composition patent;108 (2) did not prevent other generic
manufacturers from challenging the patent; 109 and (3) did not entirely foreclose
competition for tamoxifen because it had added a competitor to the market by
licensing tamoxifen to Barr.110 Accordingly, it upheld the district court’s judgment
that the agreement did not violate antitrust law. 111
D. The Federal Circuit (“Ciprofloxacin I”) and the Second Circuit (“Ciprofloxacin II”):
Presumptively Lawful When Within Patent’s Exclusionary Power
Plaintiffs consisting of direct and indirect purchasers of Bayer’s patented
ciprofloxacin hydrochloride (“Cipro”) alleged that an agreement between Bayer AG
and Barr violated antitrust law.112 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found no violation, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second
Circuit retained jurisdiction over the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ appeals
(“Ciprofloxacin II”), but transferred the indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ appeal to the
Federal Circuit due to amendments in their complaints (“Ciprofloxacin I”).113 Thus,
the facts involving the reverse payment settlements at issue were the same in both
cases.114
In response to Barr’s ANDA application with Paragraph IV certification, Bayer
brought the patent infringement action against Barr. 115 Just before trial, Bayer and
Barr entered into a settlement agreement.116 In that settlement, Bayer agreed to pay
Barr $398.1 million in exchange for Barr’s agreement that it would delay its market
entry until at least six months before the Cipro patent expired.117 Subsequently,
Bayer filed for reexamination with the USPTO, which reaffirmed the Cipro patent’s
validity.118 Thereafter, Bayer defeated four other generic manufacturers’ Paragraph
IV certification challenges to its Cipro patent. 119

Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 214–15.
110 Id. at 215.
111 Id. at 220.
112 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 740, 745 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
113 Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (Ciprofloxacin II), 604 F.3d 98, 103
(2d Cir. 2010). “The Indirect purchaser plaintiffs amended their complaint to add . . . Walker
Process antitrust . . . which recognized an antitrust claim when patents are obtained by fraud.” Id.
Because the Walker Process claims are subject to exclusive federal court jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a), these claims were transferred to the Federal Circuit. In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Ciprofloxacin I), 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
114 Ciprofloxacin II, 604 F.3d at 103.
115 Ciprofloxacin I, 544 F.3d at 1328.
116 Id. at 1328.
117 Id. at 1329.
118 Id. Reexamination of an issued patent during its effective term is available so long as a
“substantial new question of patentability” exists. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012).
119 Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 705 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d, 301 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the Cipro patent not invalid); Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No.
01CV0867-B, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27830, at *54 (S.D. Cal. Aug 7, 2002) (holding in favor of
infringement).
108
109
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In Ciprofloxacin I, the Federal Circuit, considering the indirect purchasers’
appeal, rejected the Sixth Circuit’s per se illegal approach to reverse payment
settlements, and adopted the Second Circuit’s view that “the presence of a reverse
payment, or the size of a reverse payment, alone is not enough to render an
agreement violative of the antitrust laws unless the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement exceed the scope of the patent’s protection.”120 It further agreed with the
Second and Eleventh Circuits that, “in the absence of evidence of fraud . . . or sham
litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust
analysis of a [reverse payment settlement].”121 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s judgment by holding that the agreements between Bayer
and Barr did not violate antitrust law because all anticompetitive effects were within
the exclusionary power of the Cipro patent. 122
In Ciprofloxacin II, the Second Circuit, considering the direct purchasers’
appeals, also upheld the district court’s ruling that there was no violation of antitrust
law in the agreement between Bayer and Barr. 123 By analyzing under the standard
adopted in In re Tamoxifen, the Ciprofloxacin II court found that the agreement: (1)
did not restrict the marketing of non-infringing products because Bayer had a
compound patent;124 (2) allowed other generic manufacturers to subsequently
challenge the Cipro patent, all of which Bayer had defeated; 125 and (3) did not
entirely foreclose competition because it had guaranteed Barr a license beginning at
least six months before the Cipro patent expired.126 Accordingly, this court held that
the agreement did not violate antitrust law because it did not exceed the scope of the
Cipro patent.127 At the end of the opinion, the panel “invite[d] plaintiffs-appellants to
petition for . . . rehearing [en banc]”; nonetheless, the Second Circuit declined to
reconsider its decision.128
E. The Third Circuit (2012): Rejecting the “Scope of the Patent” Test
The Third Circuit’s decision of In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation concerned the
same agreement considered by the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough Corporations
v. Federal Trade Commission.129 Schering had a formulation patent on a controlled
release coating which is applied to potassium chloride crystals.
Generic
manufacturers Upsher and ESI Lederle (“ESI”) filed separate ANDA applications
with Paragraph IV certifications. They claimed their generics would not infringe

Ciprofloxacin I, 544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (adopting the In re Tamoxifen standard).
Id. at 1336.
122 Id. at 1340.
123 Ciprofloxacin II, 604 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
124 Id. at 106.
125 Id. at 107.
126 Id. at 102.
127 Id. at 110.
128 Ciprofloxacin II, 604 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606
(2011).
129 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2012).
120
121
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Schering’s patent because their products contained a different chemical composition
of the controlled release coating than Schering’s patented product.130
The generic manufacturers settled with Schering separately, but with similar
terms: In exchange for cash, they would refrain from marketing their generic version
of K-Dur or any similar product until a certain period, at which point they would
receive a royalty-free non-exclusive license from Schering.131
Unlike the recent approaches from most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Third
Circuit squarely rejected the “scope of the patent” test and held that reverse payment
settlements are presumptively unlawful under U.S. antitrust laws, subject to two
exceptions.132 Such settlements are only lawful if: (1) parties show that the payment
was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) the agreement offers some procompetitive benefit.133
According to the court, the problem of the “scope of the patent” test was its
“almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.”134 It reiterated that “a patent
[is] simply . . . a legal conclusion reached by [sic] Patent Office” that could be
invalidated easily by the court.135 Further, it reasoned that the “scope of the patent”
test undermined the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act because it reduced the
availability of low cost generic drugs.136
The court remanded for further
proceedings.137
F. The FTC’s Rationale and the Responses from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, the FTC directly
challenged the legality of several reverse payment settlements between brand-name
and generic manufacturers.138
130 Id. at 205–06. Upsher argued that its product did not infringe Schering’s patent because its
generic product’s chemical composition of the controlled release coating is different from that of
Schering’s patent. Id. at 205. Meanwhile, ESI argued that, unlike K-Dur, its generic product was
made by a “different technology with produces a multi-layered coating with each layer comprised of
a separate material having only a single ingredient.” Id. at 206.
131 Id. at 205–06. Schering promised to pay Upsher $60 million over three years, and promised
to pay ESI an amount ranging from $5.625 million to a maximum of $15 million. Id.
132 Id. at 218.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 214.
135 Id. at 215. A FTC study conducted in 2002 showed that about seventy-three percent of the
generic manufacturers prevailed in the Hatch-Waxman litigation with the Paragraph IV
certifications. See FTC GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 21, at 16.
136 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, the court recognized
the judicial preference for settlement; however, it concluded that the reverse payment settlements
are the only patent settlement that requires antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 218.
137 Id. at 218. The Third Circuit directed the District Court on remand to apply a “quick look
rule of reason” analysis. Id.
138 Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Commission prohibited settlements under which the generic receives
anything of value and agrees to defer its own research, development, production
or sales activities. Nevertheless, the Commission carved out one arbitrary
exception for payments to the generic: beyond a "simple compromise" to the entry
date, if payments can be linked to litigation costs (not to exceed $2 million), and
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The Eleventh Circuit criticized the FTC’s low threshold for demonstrating the
anticompetitive nature of the agreements, which only required evidence of a
detrimental market effect.139 Because both the rule of reason and the per se analysis
seek to determine whether the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect on
the market, it held “both approaches to be ill-suited for an antitrust analysis of
patent cases.”140
Further, the Hatch-Waxman process has enabled generic manufacturers to
challenge the validity of a patent “without incurring the cost of entry or risking
enormous damages flowing from any possible infringement.”141 As such, the court
concluded that “reverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman
process.”142 “If settlement negotiations fail and the patentee prevails in its suit,
competition would be prevented to the same or an even greater extent because the
generic could not enter the market prior to the expiration of the patent.”143 As
discussed above, other U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted the reasoning of this
case.144
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit denied another FTC challenge to a reverse
payment settlement that involved a formulation patent for synthetic testosterone.145
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC’s argument that the settlement violated
antitrust law because the patent owner was “not likely to prevail” in the underlying
infringement action, and reasoned, “it is simply not true that an infringement claim
that is ‘likely’ to fail actually will fail.”146 It further stated that “Congress has
given . . . the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases” and
the Eleventh Circuit and other non-specialized circuit courts are “ill-equipped to
make a judgment about the merits of a patent infringement claim.”147 Lastly, the
court suggested that “[i]f the patent actually is vulnerable, then presumably other
generic companies . . . will attempt to enter the market and make their own
challenges to the patent.”148

the Commission is notified of the settlement, then the parties need not worry
about a later antitrust attack.
Id. at 1062.
139 Id. at 1065.
140 Id. at 1065.
141 Id. at 1074.
142 Id. at 1075.
143 Id.
144 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003); Ciprofloxacin I,
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ciprofloxacin II, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
145 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). A prior
patent covering the synthetic testosterone used in AndroGel had expired, but a patent for a
particular gel formulation of it was issued. Id. This patent is set to expire in August 2020. Id. at
1304.
146 Id. at 1312. “Likely” means more likely than not, which includes a 51% chance of a result
one way and a 49% chance of a result on the other way. Id. The court rejected the FTC’s “not likely
to prevail” standard because “a chance is only a chance, not a certainty.” Id. at 1313.
147 Id. at 1314.
148 Id. at 1315.
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G. The Scholars’ Debate
As the decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals suggest, reverse payment
settlements have created significant tension between the exclusionary nature of
patents and the anti-competitive nature of these settlements.149 Not surprisingly,
the tension due to the lack of consistency afforded by the courts has drawn the
attention of a number of prominent intellectual property and competition law
scholars.150
Professors Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley have
suggested a rule that reverse payment settlements should be “presumptively
unlawful, shifting the burden of proof to the [settling parties].”151 Then, the settling
patentee must show: (1) “that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement
lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size for the payment is no more than the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”152
However, Professor Thomas F. Cotter suggested the impossibility of assessing
patent strength ex ante.153
While Professor Cotter believes that Professors
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley’s test is helpful, “requiring antitrust tribunals to
scrutinize the merits of a settled IP dispute threatens to unravel the substantial
private and social benefits to which the settlement gives rise, including the reduction
in litigation costs that settlement generally promotes.”154 Further, in some cases,
settlements that exceed the value of litigation costs could also be pro-competitive.155
In Professor Cotter’s view, the validity of a patent could be measured by the use of
the settlement amount, thereby subjecting it to antitrust scrutiny, because “higher
[reverse] payments are consistent with a high probability of success, and low
payments are consistent with a low probability of success.”156
Professor David W. Opderbeck strongly opposed Professor Cotter’s view on the
use of the settlement amount as a proxy for patent validity because: (1) “many
reverse payment settlements involve unrelated licenses, authorized generic sales,
and other side deals . . . in lieu of monetary payments”; (2) unlike an ordinary patent
case, the [ANDA] challenger faces no risk beyond litigation expenses; and (3) there is
a possibility of multiple Paragraph IV challenges by different ANDA filers. 157
Instead, he has proposed the “Settlement Competition Index,” which provides a
rough empirical gauge of the potential anticompetitive effects of the settlement. 158
149 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 901–02; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466
F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006); Ciprofloxacin I, 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ciprofloxacin II,
604 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2010); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
150 See Dolin, supra note 5, at 312.
151 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1759.
152 Id.
153 Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent
Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1789, 1815 (2003).
154 Id. at 1795.
155 Id. at 1802–09 (“[P]er se treatment of reverse payment settlements is inappropriate,
because these agreements also have some potential to enhance rather than impede efficiency.”).
156 Id. at 1814.
157 Opderbeck, supra note 5, at 1325–28.
158 See id. at 1329.

[12:787 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

804

Professor Gregory Dolin took a somewhat different tack after reviewing
disagreements between the courts and scholars.159 Although a valid patent does not
give the patentee any exemption from antitrust law, “the essence of a patent grant is
the right to exclude others.”160 According to Professor Dolin, the question “ultimately
turns on the validity of a patent, not on any payment from the patentee to the
challenger.”161 Thus, he suggested that patent law, instead of antitrust law, would be
a far better instrument to address the issues involving reverse payment settlements
such as reexamination proceedings.162
In theory, reexamination is a cost-effective process with a lower standard of
proof to challenge a patent because there is no presumption of validity of the
patent.163 Further, the Patent Act authorizes “[a]ny person at any time [to] file a
request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any
prior art.”164 Accordingly, Professor Dolin proposed that “any reverse settlement
where the amount of money paid to the generic challenger exceeds reasonable
litigation costs plus reasonable payments for any cross-licenses that are part of the
agreement should be referred to the PTO [for reexamination].”165
While this approach is quite solicitous of reverse payment settlements, it too
presents significant problems. First, both ex parte and inter partes reexamination
processes induce a burden on the third party requesters. 166
In ex parte
reexamination, a third party requester cannot appeal the decision.167 Although an
appeal is allowed in inter partes reexamination, the third party is estopped from
raising issues in subsequent civil litigation that he “raised or could have raised” in
the reexamination.168 Thus, the process may deter third parties from pursuing these
proceedings.169 Second, the success rate for complete invalidation is very low: only
See Dolin, supra note 5, at 318.
Id. at 318 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980)).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 318–19.
163 Id. at 319. At trial, the patentee enjoys the presumption that the patent at issue is valid.
Id. In a reexamination proceeding at USPTO, on the other hand, there is no presumption of validity
because the reexamination “departs from the same starting point as the original examination.” Id.
Thus, any person may submit a request for reexamination including the patentee or a third party.
Id. For example, the patentee may seek reexamination of an issued patent when he is faced with a
validity challenge and prefers to litigate the issue before the agency, where the cost is much lower.
Ciprofloxacin I, 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Bayer cancelled and amended certain claims
to re-validate its existing Cipro patent).
164 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). The person who is challenging the validity of a patent must identify
the prior art that he believes is relevant, and that raises a “substantial new question of
patentability.” Id.
165 Dolin, supra note 5, at 324.
166 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (ex parte reexamination); 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (inter partes
reexamination).
167 35 U.S.C. § 306.
168 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
169 Between the years 1999 and 2009, only seventy-seven inter partes reexamination
certificates were issued. See COMM’R FOR PATENTS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER
PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
patents/documents/inter_partes.pdf. In contrast, 6908 ex parte reexamination certificates were
issued between 1981 and 2009. See COMM’R FOR PATENTS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 2 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
patents/documents/ex_parte.pdf.
159
160
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11% of the 6908 ex parte reexaminations resulted in the patent being invalidated, 170
while 60% of the 77 inter partes reexaminations resulted in the same.171 Although
the vast majority of reexaminations result in amendment of the claims (64% in ex
parte and 35% in inter partes), patentees could easily and readily amend the claims
to avoid prior art but still include the challengers’ infringing product.172
III. PROPOSAL
As the decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the scholars’ debates
suggest, courts have consistently struggled to apply appropriate laws or tests when
they are confronted with the issues involving reverse payment settlements.173 The
lack of a national standard has created inconsistencies in court rulings over the past
decade. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court finally agreed to review an antitrust challenge
to reverse payment settlements and granted certiorari on December 7, 2012. 174
The inconsistency among the U.S. Courts of Appeals could be resolved by several
means. For example, Congress could enact legislation to remove or modify the 180day exclusivity period for the first ANDA filer. 175 Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court could provide effective guidance on which law should govern when it
involves reverse payment settlements.
This section proposes a set of rules that may guide the legislative branch and the
United States Supreme Court in making decisions on reverse payment settlement
issues. A suggestion to Congress is presented, which is followed by a set of rules and
accompanying explanations for the U.S. Supreme Court to examine in reconciling
differing court decisions.
A. A Suggestion to Congress
The legislature should consider adopting the FDA’s former “successful defense”
requirement. Complete removal of the 180-day exclusive period has been vigorously
criticized.176 Subsequent reactions from the legislative branch to address reverse
settlement problems were also unsuccessful due to the lack of consistency in
congressional findings.177
EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 169, at 2.
INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 169.
172 EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 169, at 2; INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 169.
173 See Dolin, supra note 5, at 312.
174 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), petition for cert. granted,
81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
175 Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 516–19 (2007).
176 Id. at 516–19.
This complete removal of the 180-day exclusivity period did not attract
attention very much because this exclusivity period is the essence of achieving Hatch-Waxman Act’s
very purpose: to provide incentives to challenge weak patents, thereby, to promote low drug prices
to general public. Id.
177 See Dolin, supra note 5, at 305–10.
For example, Senator Herb Kohl introduced the
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act. Id. at 306. In his newest version of the bill, the reverse
170
171
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Prior to 1998, the FDA required a “successful defense” to ANDA filers who
wanted to take advantage of the 180-day exclusivity period.178 A first-filer would
only retain its 180-day exclusivity period if it successfully defends against an
infringement suit.179 However, the FDA dropped its “successful defense” requirement
after it was held to be an unreasonable interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.180
The court reasoned that the FDA’s “successful defense” requirement did not reflect
the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”181 While holding the requirement
void, the Court, nonetheless, suggested that the “FDA could have adopted a more
narrow solution to the problem of first applicants who are never sued or who lose
their suits,” instead of adopting its broad rule.182
This “successful defense” requirement would be a great starting point for the
legislature to address the reverse payment settlement problems by narrowly tailoring
it to specific circumstances. For example, Congress could amend the award of the
180-day exclusivity period contingent upon the “successful defense” of any
subsequent ANDA filer. In other words, any ANDA filer who renders the patent at
issue either invalid or unenforceable will be able to take the 180-day exclusivity
period away from the first ANDA filer. Consistent with the primary purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, this proposal will encourage subsequent generic companies to
attack the validity of patents that are settled by reverse payments. As the Eleventh
Circuit stated, “[b]lood in the water can lead to a feeding frenzy.”183
B. A Suggestion to the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court could provide a rigid rule on which law should govern
in reverse payment settlement cases. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court should
reconcile the decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals by scrutinizing the details of
the settlements because every settlement is different and should be decided on a
case-by-case analysis.184
For example, in In re Cardizem, the Sixth Circuit rendered the settlement illegal
per se because it had prevented the generic manufacturer from marketing noninfringing products of a formulation patent, an agreement that clearly could be
anticompetitive.185 In contrast, the Second Circuit in In re Tamoxifen distinguished
payment settlements would be presumptively unlawful and anti-competitive, but the settling parties
would be permitted to rebut the presumption by demonstrating the pro-competitive benefits by clear
and convincing evidence. S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009). Further, the Act suggested that any
payment that does not exceed $7.5 million is allowed to reimburse the ANDA filer “for reasonable
litigation expenses.” Id.
178 See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069–70 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
179 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (2013). In drafting the regulations implementing § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv),
the FDA added its own requirement that the first applicant must have “successfully defended
against a suit for patent infringement” before the exclusivity period can begin to run. Id.
180 See Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1069–70 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the FDA’s “successful
defense” requirement is inconsistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress).
181 Id. at 1068.
182 Id. at 1069–70.
183 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).
184 See supra Part II.
185 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
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the Sixth Circuit’s decision and upheld the settlement because the tamoxifen patent
was not a formulation patent; “rather, it [was] a patent on a compound that, by its
nature, excludes all generic versions of the drug.”186 Further, by including a license
from Zeneca to Barr, it actually added a competitor in the market. 187 Subsequent
reverse settlements in Ciprofloxacin cases were held valid where the settlement not
only involved a compound patent, but also gave licenses to generic companies.188
Lastly, the Third Circuit held the settlement illegal in In re K-Dur.189 The court
voided the settlement that had prevented the generic company from marketing noninfringing products of a formulation patent, even though the settlement contained a
licensing agreement.190
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court should consider these differences in
determining the legality of reverse payment settlements, and should consider the
following set of rules.
First, a reverse payment settlement is presumed legal if it involves a licensing
agreement on a compound patent. The only way to rebut this presumption of legality
is to invalidate the patent under patent law.
Second, a reverse payment settlement is presumed illegal where it involves a
formulation patent and entirely forecloses competition by preventing the generic
manufacturers from marketing non-infringing products. A licensing agreement may
rebut the presumption of illegality so long as marketing non-infringing products is
not material to the parties or non-parties.
CONCLUSION
Tension between patent law and antitrust law surrounding reverse payment
settlements is a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Patent law’s right to
exclude will likely clash with the pro-competitive nature of antitrust law. Although
the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted to eliminate weak patents and to bring cheaper
drugs to the general public, this goal may be hindered by such settlements. Solely
applying either patent law or antitrust law may result in harsh punishment for
patent holders, competitors, and consumers. An ideal solution involves the
accommodation of both laws by balancing the effects more appropriately among the
parties. Thus, this comment offers a set of rules to guide the legislature and the
Supreme Court in determining the legality of such reverse payment settlements.

In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 214 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 215.
188 Ciprofloxacin I, 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ciprofloxacin II, 604 F.3d 98, 103 (2d
Cir. 2010).
189 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 205–06 (3d Cir. 2012) (precluding “any sustainedrelease microencapsulated potassium chloride”).
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